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Abstract
Background:  Earlier cost-effectiveness studies showed the cost-effectiveness ratios for
pneumococcal vaccination in preventing cases of Bacteremic Pneumococcal Disease (BPD) alone
to vary between € 11,000 and € 33,000 per quality-adjusted life year. If vaccination is also assumed
to be effective in preventing cases of Non Bacteremic Pneumococcal Disease (NBPD) (at the same
level of effectiveness), vaccinating all elderly persons becomes highly cost-effective or even cost
saving.
Methods: The present article examines the effect of partial preventive power of the vaccine
against cases of NBPD additional to its preventive power against cases of BPD, and the
consequences this has in terms of cost-effectiveness.
Results: The analysis shows that even a fairly small additional preventive power against cases of
NBPD leads to a dramatic and unexpected decrease in the cost-effectiveness ratio.
Conclusion: Because a Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (CER) is a ratio, changes in costs and changes in
effects have rather different influences on its value. There is a linear relation between a change in
costs and a change in CER if the effects are kept constant. This linear relation is not found on the
effect side. Assuming that costs are constant, a change in effect will be different for low levels of
effect than for high levels.
Introduction
Data on efficacy or effectiveness are often among the cor-
nerstones of the calculations of Cost-Effectiveness Ratios
(CERs) and information on such effect variables is crucial
for the decision-making process [1,2].
As an example, this article considers the lack of informa-
tion regarding the effectiveness of the vaccine for pneu-
mococcal pneumonia. There is rather strong evidence that
this vaccine prevents cases of Bacteremic Pneumococcal
Disease (BPD), which however represents only a minority
of cases of pneumococcal disease (about 15%) [3-7].
There is much less evidence (some experts say no evi-
dence) that the vaccine also prevents cases of Non Bacter-
emic Pneumococcal Disease (NBPD) [8]. Several
published studies have calculated cost-effectiveness ratios
(CERs) of pneumococcal vaccination programmes for the
elderly [9-14]. In the earlier studies, the assumption was
made that the vaccine was able to prevent cases of NBPD
to the same degree as it prevents cases of BPD. The overall
conclusion of the studies based on this equal effectiveness
assumption was that vaccination of the elderly is highly
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cost-effective, or indeed in many instances even cost sav-
ing. However, the results of these studies did not have a
great impact on the use of the vaccine in many countries.
The hesitation to use the vaccine can be explained by var-
ious factors, including the rigorous assumption of equal
effectiveness of the vaccine for BPD and NBPD. Three
more recent studies have focused on the BPD subgroup in
calculating the CERs of the vaccination programme
[11,13,14]. If it can be shown that the vaccine is cost-effec-
tive by preventing cases of BPD alone, this would mean
that the vaccine would definitely be cost-effective if it
additionally prevents some cases of NBPD, which form
the majority of cases. However, the three studies yielded
inconsistent results. Sisk et al. [11] presented results show-
ing that vaccination would save costs in the US, whereas
the other two studies [13,14] presented CERs for Euro-
pean countries ranging from € 10,000 and € 40,000 per
quality-adjusted life year (QALY) for different age groups.
All of the above-mentioned studies regarded the preven-
tive power of the vaccine against cases of NBPD as a binary
variable: either the vaccine prevents no cases of NBPD or
it prevents cases of NBPD to the same degree as it prevents
cases of BPD. At this point, there is not much empirical
evidence regarding this crucial aspect. Moreover, it is not
to be expected that more specific information on the effi-
cacy of the vaccine against NBPD will become available in
the near future. Due to power rules, such a trial would cost
a tremendous amount of money. This means that deci-
sions about the introduction of the vaccine and the fur-
ther expansion of its use will have to be based on present-
day knowledge, with its inherent uncertainty regarding
the vaccine's effectiveness.
In this article we take one further step in investigating the
possible partial preventive power of the vaccine against
cases of NBPD additional to its preventive power against
cases of BPD, and the consequences of such additional
prevention in terms of cost-effectiveness. In an earlier
short article [15], we discussed the results of an additional
partial effectiveness of the vaccine against cases of NBPD,
and attributed the unexpected results we found merely to
the fact that there are far more cases of NBPD than of BPD.
Due to space limitations, we were unable to address the
technical aspects of the additional analysis in that article,
or to discuss the consequences in more detail. Nor were
we able to explain the specific influence of the partial
effectiveness of the vaccine against cases of NBPD on the
resulting CERs. The present article conducts a more pro-
found analysis and discusses the unexpected results in
more detail. Additionally, it uses a graphical method to
explain the results. It also explores why the results are
unexpected, an analysis that might be useful for other
investigators who are confronted with similar problems.
The next section provides some background information,
together with the overall results of the European study
(15), an analysis that forms the basis of all further analy-
ses in this article. This is followed by a section explaining
the methodological aspects of the additional analysis and
presenting the detailed results of this analysis, including
the influence of a potential additional preventive power
against cases of NBPD. The final section further investi-
gates why these results are unexpected and draws more
general conclusions from the analysis.
Background
The present additional analysis is based on the results of
an earlier study of the cost-effectiveness of a vaccination
programme in five European countries [15]. The analysis
uses clinical and economic variables that are unique to
each country and considers cost savings from simultane-
ous administration of pneumococcal and influenza vac-
cines. In the base case analyses, the cost-effectiveness
ratios for pneumococcal vaccination in preventing cases
of BPD alone vary between € 11,000 and € 33,000 per
QALY among the five countries. Using more plausible epi-
demiological assumptions of the incidence (50 cases per
100,000) and mortality (20% to 40%) of invasive disease,
the cost-effectiveness ratios are € 12,000 or less per QALY
in all five countries. If vaccination is also assumed to be
effective in preventing cases of NBPD (at the same level of
effectiveness), vaccinating all elderly persons would be
highly cost-effective or even cost saving.
The above analysis (16) included only CERs correspond-
ing to extreme positions: either no preventive power
against NBPD or the same degree of preventive power
against NBPD as against BPD.
Our implicit assumption was that intermediate positions
between these two extremes could be easily calculated by
simple interpolation of the results in terms of CERs. If, for
example, the CER for BPD alone in a particular country
were 30,000 and the CER for BPD and NBPD were 10,000,
we would expect, from a prior point of view, that, starting
from the situation 'BPD alone' (CER = 30,000) an addi-
tional 10% preventive power against NBPD would lead to
a situation characterised by a CER of (say) 28,000 (10% of
the difference between the two extremes). We did not
anticipate that such a small additional preventive power
would in fact have a major impact on the resulting CER.
Explaining this huge difference between expectations and
reality requires a stepwise analysis.
Methods
Since this additional analysis was not foreseen at the start
of the above European study [15], it was not possible to
apply the existing model ex post to produce the CERs for
intermediate levels of effectiveness directly. However, itCost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2005, 3:3 http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/3/1/3
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was possible to derive the CERs for intermediate steps of
preventive power in an alternative way. Although the
model developed for the European study is a rather com-
plex and sophisticated cohort model, the outcomes of the
model in terms of costs and benefits are linearly related to
the input variable 'efficacy'. To calculate the costs, for
example, the model starts with the incidence of the dis-
ease, after which the incidence is multiplied by the effi-
cacy of the vaccine. This result is then multiplied by the
protection rate of the vaccine, and the resulting figure is
multiplied by the number of cases hospitalised. The result
is then multiplied by the number of hospital days, and
finally by the cost of one hospital day. This multiplicative
model leads to the conclusion that the input variable 'effi-
cacy' shows a linear relation with the outcome variable
'costs', a conclusion that is verified by the model. This lin-
earity is also found for the outcomes in terms of QALY's.
The consequence of this linear relation is that increasing
the efficacy rate (expressed as a percentage) by a certain
step results in the same change in effect, expressed as
QALY's or as costs. In algebraic terms the cost can be
expressed in the following formulas:
1) C = a + b * x (0<x<1)




a, b, c and d are constant
x is vaccine efficacy for cases of NBPD
The presence of linearity in the model made it possible to
interpolate between the extreme outcomes (zero preven-
tion against NBPD and same efficacy against NBPD as
against BPD). As an example, let us discuss the results for
Scotland in more detail.
The data for 'step 0' and 'step 10' include the existing data
on the costs and benefits for Scotland, which were used
for the calculation of the CERs [15]. Step 0 corresponds to
the situation where the vaccine is assumed to prevent only
cases of BPD, whereas step 10 assumes that the vaccine
prevents cases of NBPD to the same degree as it prevents
BPD. The 10 intermediate steps are interpolated, based on
these two extremes.
Results
The first surprising observation that can be made from
Table 1 is that in the first step, the CER drops from an ini-
tial level of about € 15,000 per QALY to a level of € 7,000
per QALY. In the next step, where the vaccine is assumed
to prevent an additional 10% of potential cases of NBPD,
the CER drops to a level of about € 4,000. Alternatively, it
can also be concluded in this case that an improvement in
the effectiveness from say 70% to 100% would have not
much impact on the resulting CER, as it would decrease
from € 705 per QALY to € 242 per QALY! This makes pre-
dicting the influence of a change in effectiveness on the
CER virtually impossible. The linearity that was present in
the separate calculations of costs and benefits (see the first
columns of the table) is no longer found in the CERs in
the final column. In this specific decision environment,
this would imply that if a decision maker would refuse to
finance a vaccination programme based on the hard
evidence for vaccine efficacy for BPD alone, a small addi-
tional preventive power of the vaccine against cases of
NBPD would suffice to make it a (very) cost-effective
intervention.
Table 1: Cost-effectiveness ratios for intermediate degrees of vaccine efficacy in preventing cases of NBPD in Scotland
Assumed preventive power for NBPD Costs in € Million* QALY's* CER Reduction in CER as 
percentage
0% effectiveness for NBPD 147.7 9923 14892
Step 1 (10% increase) 135.6 19777 6858 53.9
Step 2 123.4 29630 4167 18.1
Step 3 111.3 39483 2820 9.1
Step 4 99.1 49337 2010 5.4
Step 5 87.0 59190 1470 3.6
Step 6 74.9 69044 1084 2.3
Step 7 62.7 78897 795 1.9
Step 8 50.6 88750 570 1.5
Step 9 38.4 98604 390 1.2
Same effectiveness against NBPD as against BPD 26.3 108457 242 1.0
*Cost and benefits of intermediate steps in preventive power against NBPD interpolated based on the linearity of the modelCost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2005, 3:3 http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/3/1/3
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This phenomenon is by no means specific to Scotland.
Table 2 shows it to be present in all five European coun-
tries, although the effect is larger in some countries than
in others.
From a decision analysis point of view, the changes in the
first steps are particularly relevant, because they imply that
a fairly small additional preventive power against NBPD
makes the vaccine cost-effective. With the exception of
France, the CERs in all countries decrease by 50% or more
in the first step (10% preventive power against NBPD
cases). In the second step (20% preventive power against
NBPD) the CERs are reduced further, to even more attrac-
tive levels.
This additional analysis leads to the general conclusion
that a relatively small preventive power of the vaccine
against cases of NBPD is enough to make vaccination for
pneumococcal disease a very attractive investment com-
pared with other health care interventions.
Discussion
At the start of our European study of the cost-effectiveness
of the pneumococcal vaccine [15], we did not have a clue
about the existence of the phenomenon described above,
nor would we have thought that the impact of a small
additional preventive power against NBPD would be as
great as it turned out to be. This is why only the two
extreme situations for the effectiveness of the vaccine were
considered in our original analysis. None of the earlier
articles on cost-effectiveness investigated or even men-
tioned this phenomenon. What is the reason for the huge
differences between reality and (our) expectations at this
point?
We will answer this question in two different ways: an
algebraic and a graphical way.
For the algebraic analysis the formula's 1 and 2 have to be
specified a little bit further.
The costs as a function of vaccine efficacy (x) can be
expressed as follows:
3) C = C0 - x * (C0- C1)
where: C0 is costs if x = 0
C1 is costs if x = 1
C0 and C1 (for Scotland) can be found in table 1 and are €
147.7 million and € 26.3 million respectively.
The cost as a function of vaccine efficacy for NBPD is
therefore:
4) C = 147.7 * 106 - x * 121.4 * 106
The number of QALY's as a function of vaccine efficacy (x)
can be expressed as follows:
5) Q = Q0 - x * (Q0-Q1)
where: Q0 is number of QALY's if x = 0
Q1 is number of QALY's if x = 1
Q0 and Q1 (for Scotland) can be found in table 1 and are
9923 and 108457 respectively.
The QALY's as a function of vaccine efficacy for NBPD is
therefore:
6) Q = 9923 - x * 98534
Table 2: Cost-effectiveness ratios for intermediate degrees of vaccine efficacy in preventing cases of NBPD in 5 European countries.
Assumed preventive Power against NBPD Belgium France Scotland Spain Sweden
0% effectiveness against NBPD 25907 19182 14892 10511 32675
Step 1 (10% increase) 13678 15801 6858 4383 10158
Step 2 (20% increase) 8313 13085 4167 2126 4217
Step 3 (30% increase) 5300 10857 2820 954 1473
Step 4 (40% increase) 3370 8995 2010 235 Cost saving
Step 5 (50% increase) 2028 7415 1470 Cost saving Cost saving
Step 6 (60% increase) 1041 6058 1084 Cost saving Cost saving
Step 7 (70% increase) 285 4881 795 Cost saving Cost saving
Step 8 (80% increase) Cost saving 3849 570 Cost saving Cost saving
Step 9 (90% increase) Cost saving 2938 390 Cost saving Cost saving
Step 10 (same effectiveness against NBPD as against BPD) Cost saving 2127 242 Cost saving Cost savingCost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2005, 3:3 http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/3/1/3
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The CER as a function of vaccine efficacy for NBPD has the
following form:
7) f(x) = (C0 - x * (C0- C1))) / (Q0 - x * (Q0-Q1))), (0<x<1).
For x is 0 the value of the function becomes C0 / Q0, which
is our original ICER for zero vaccine efficacy for NBPD.
For x is 1 the value of the function becomes C1/Q1, which
is our original ICER for 100% vaccine efficacy for NBPD.
It is obvious that in general de function f(x) is an expo-
nential declining function, which explains, to a certain
degree, the specific behaviour of the CER; huge declines in
CER for low values of x and small declines when x reaches
the value 1. An impression of this can be based on the data
of table 1, where the CER's (of Scotland) as a function of
vaccine efficacy for NBPD are given in column 4.
A graphical representation allows us to clarify the causes
of this phenomenon in another way. Figure 1 shows a
graphic representation of the data for Scotland. One
extreme represents the costs and benefits under the
assumption that the vaccine prevents only cases of BPD
(S0) while the other extreme represents the assumption
that cases of NBPD are prevented to the same degree as
those of BPD (S10). The other points represent the costs
and benefits in the consecutive steps. Due to the linearity
of the model, these 10 steps are positioned on a straight
line, and indicated as S1, S2 etc.
But why do the CERs for S0  to S10  show non-linear
behaviour?
We have to show that equal steps in costs and/or benefits
do not automatically lead to equal differences in CERs.
The first step (10% preventive power against NBPD) takes
us to point S1. Starting from S0, there are numerous
alternative ways in which a CER of this level could be
reached. One of these ways would be to lower the cost
from S0 to level A1 (see figure), another to increase the
benefits from S0 to B1, but other combinations are also
possible. A1, S1 and B1 are on the same line through the
origin and therefore have the same CER.
Starting from S0, a rather small increase in benefits has the
same effect (in terms of CER) as a rather large decrease in
costs. Looking at the steps from S9 to S10, we see the oppo-
site: in this area a rather small decrease in costs has the
Costs and benefits of intermediate steps of partial effectiveness against NBPD for Scotland Figure 1
Costs and benefits of intermediate steps of partial effectiveness against NBPD for ScotlandCost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2005, 3:3 http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/3/1/3
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same impact as a rather huge increase in benefits. It will
be clear from this observation that the ratio between costs
and benefits changes in each of the 10 steps. This phe-
nomenon can be visualised in a different way, using the
structure of CERs.
As many authors have suggested, CERs can be visualised
in graphic representations [[1,2,16-18], and [19]]. These
graphs may help to identify the most cost-effective inter-
ventions within a set of compatible (mutually non-exclu-
sive) alternatives. Graphs can also be helpful in
identifying the best candidate in a set of incompatible
(mutually exclusive) alternatives [17]. Often there is no
need to pay attention to the precise underlying structure
of CERs. For exemple, Laupacis et al. [16] in their original
article drew CER lines in a rather arbitrary way.
The above observations do not hamper decision-making,
as long as only 'ordinal' conclusions are drawn, for exam-
ple, that intervention A is more cost-effective than inter-
vention B. However, absolute changes in the position of
an intervention in the graph might lead to unexpected
results, as will be shown below.
In figure 2 the exact position of different CER-lines are
drawn, based on figure 1. The figure clearly shows that dif-
ferent incremental increases in preventive power of the
vaccine must lead to different effects on the resulting CER.
The first increase in preventive power against cases of
NBPD (step 1) cuts from a CER of (about) € 15,000 per
QALY through a whole series of nearby CER lines and
ends up at a CER of € 7,000 per QALY. The next step
would bring this down further, to a CER of € 4,000, a rel-
atively minor decrease compared with the previous step.
In absolute terms, however, both steps are identical, in
that they consist of the same decrease in costs and benefit.
The above analysis allows the conclusion that a particular
change in costs and benefits will not lead to a fixed change
in the CER. The impact of such a change in costs and/or
benefits on the resulting CER depends on the starting
point in the graph. In our example, it could be said that
the position of the line S0-S10 determines the resulting
CER. This is the reason why the effects of a partial effec-
tiveness of the pneumococcal vaccine against NBPD are
different in different countries.
CERs for technologies characterised by costs per QALY of € 1,000, € 2,000, € 3,000 etc Figure 2
CERs for technologies characterised by costs per QALY of € 1,000, € 2,000, € 3,000 etc. can be easily constructed using the 
constant vertical distance (a) between the linesCost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 2005, 3:3 http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/3/1/3
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Conclusion
If the pneumococcal vaccine has even a small preventive
power against NBPD, this would make vaccination
against pneumococcal pneumonia a very cost-effective
intervention. While it is very unlikely that the vaccine is as
effective in preventing cases of NBPD as it is in preventing
cases of BPD, it is also unlikely that the vaccine does not
prevent any cases of NBPD. The above analysis shows that
a very small additional preventive power against NBPD
(about 5 to 10%) changes the cost-effectiveness of this
vaccination programme, on average, from a level just
below the maximum value per QALY (€ 20,000 per
QALY) to a level of € 10,000 per QALY, a level that in
most industrialised countries would be considered a good
health investment. Without the above analysis, policy-
making would be very complicated, because of the uncer-
tainty about the preventive power and the uncertainty
about the maximum value per QALY. With this analysis,
there is less uncertainty and policymakers can be more
confident in deciding to introduce the vaccination pro-
gramme for the population aged 65 and older.
Is there a more general principle behind the above
phenomenon?
To answer this question we have to look back to the con-
cept of CER itself. CER is defined as (incremental) costs
divided by (incremental) effects. It is obvious that a CER
increases as costs increase, if the effects are kept constant.
An increase in cost by an amount x will lead to an increase
in CER of y, independent of the volume of the costs. There
is a linear relation between a change in costs and a change
in CER if we keep the effects constant.
This linear relation is not found on the effect side. Assum-
ing that the costs are constant, a change in effect will be
different for low effect levels than for high levels. Adding
1 QALY to an intervention that produces 1 QALY leads to
a reduction of 50% in CER, whereas adding 1 QALY to 10
QALY's results in a 10% reduction in CER. With regard to
effects, a relative  increase will always lead to the same
change in CER, whereas with regard to the costs, an abso-
lute change will lead to the same change in CER. In the
above case of a partial increase in preventive power, the
costs and benefits increase by the same amount in each
step, but we now see that it is merely the effects that lead
to the unexpected results: merely changing the costs by a
particular amount would not have this effect. We stated
above that our model was a multiplicative model as
regards costs and effects. We used this property of the
model only to calculate costs and benefits corresponding
to intermediate steps in preventive power in an easy man-
ner. We can therefore conclude that the above results are
not restricted to this type of linear model, but are to be
expected in general. The above phenomenon depends on
the ratio approach, not on the model used.
The above analysis leads to several observations In the
first place, intuition might be not a good instrument to
predict the CER consequences of changes in costs and
(especially) benefits. In the above example the conse-
quences of partial effectiveness of the pneumococcal vac-
cine for the CERs were totally unexpected. In the example,
the effectiveness determines both costs and benefits of the
CER, which makes prediction of effects more complicated.
Researchers who are thinking of performing sensitivity
analyses should be aware of the fact that in some cases
even very small changes in variables could have huge
impacts on the resulting CERs. It will not always be easy
to anticipate or predict this impact, due to the exponential
character of the CER itself.
Laupacis et al. (1992) were among the first to use graphs
to represent CERs of different interventions, although the
principle had already been described as early as 1986 (See
for example Anderson et al., 1986). Gold et al. suggested
that researchers should make use of such graphs, because
they are handsome, concise and easy to understand. In
their original graph, Laupacis et al. represented two CERs:
one for interventions with a CER of $20,000 and the other
with a CER of $100,000. The two lines in their figure are
drawn rather arbitrarily, whereas in reality the position of
the two lines should be fixed (see above). In analysing the
results in a graph, one should understand the underlying
structure of the CERs (see figure 2), especially in cases
where interventions are presented in absolute positions,
as was the case in our example of the pneumococcal vac-
cine. If the graph is used to prioritise compatible alterna-
tives according to cost-effectiveness, using the wrong
graph would be no big problem. However, if one is inter-
ested in identifying the best candidate within a set of
incompatible alternatives, using the right framework
becomes crucial.
A last observation of our analysis has to do with the term
'cost-effective' itself. It has already been recognised before
that the term 'cost-effective' is rather unspecified. What is
the real meaning of the expression: intervention A is more
cost-effective than intervention B? This becomes even
more troublesome if one considers different interventions
in a QALY League Table. People are often inclined to think
that the difference between interventions with CERs of
10,000 and 20,000 is the same as that between interven-
tions with CERs of 50,000 and 60,000, because the differ-
ence in CER is the same in both situations. In reality, it is
impossible to decide which of the two interventions is
better as long as we have no separate information on costs
and benefits. This observation also leads to the conclusion
that it is impossible to say whether it is better to improvePublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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the cost-effectiveness of one particular technology from
(for example) € 10,000 to € 20,000 than to improve the
cost-effectiveness of another technology from € 50,000 to
€ 60,000. This means that the cost-effectiveness scale in
itself is not a cardinal scale but only an ordinal scale.
Needless to say, the incremental-net-benefit parameter
recently proposed by many authors behaves in a much
more straightforward way in this respect than the above
incremental CER, providing another argument in favour
of the net benefit approach.
Competing interests
The original study was supported by a grant of Aventis
Pasteur MSD. The above study was performed totally
independent from Aventis Pasteur MSD.
Authors' contributions
The authors worked together in close cooperation on the
concepts and methodological aspects of the study. The
first author produced the first drafts, whereas the second
author produced many valuable contributions.
References
1. Drummond MF, O'Brien B, Stoddart GL, Torrance GW: Methods for
the Economic Evaluation of Health Care Programmes Oxford University
Press: Oxford; 1997. 
2. Gold MR, Siegel JE, Russell LB, Weinstein MC: Cost-effectiveness in
Health and Medicine Oxford University Press: Oxford; 1996. 
3. Fine MJ, Smith MA, Carson CA, Meffe F, Sankey SS, Weissfeld LA,
Detsky AS, Kapoor WN: Efficacy of pneumococcal vaccination
in adults. A meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials.
Arch Intern Med 1994, 154(23):2666-2677.
4. Fedson DS: The clinical effectiveness of pneumococcal vacci-
nation: a brief review. Vaccine 1999, 17(Suppl 1):S85-90.
5. Hutchison BG, Oxman AD, Shannon HS, Lloyd S, Altmayer CA, Tho-
mas K: Clinical effectiveness of pneumococcal vaccine. Meta-
analysis. Can Fam Physician 1999, 45:2381-2393.
6. Nichol KL, Baken L, Wuorenma J, Nelson A: The health and eco-
nomic benefits associated with pneumococcal vaccination of
elderly persons with chronic lung disease. Arch Intern Med 1999,
159(20):2437-2442.
7. Shapiro ED, Berg AT, Austrian R, Schroeder D, Parcells V, Margolis
A, Adair RK, Clemens JD: The protective efficacy of polyvalent
pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine.  N Engl J Med 1991,
325(21):1453-1460.
8. Moore RA, Wiffen PJ, Lipsky BA: Are the pneumococcal polysac-
charide vaccines effective? Meta-analysis of the prospective
trials. BMC Fam Pract 2000, 1(1):.
9. Sisk JE, Riegelman RK: Cost-effectiveness of vaccination against
pneumococcal pneumonia: an update.  Ann Intern Med 1986,
104:79-86.
10. Plans-Rubio PP, Morales PG, Sanmarti LS: Coste-efectividad de la
vacunacion neumococia en Cataluna. Rev Esp Salud Publica 1995,
69:409-417.
11. Jimenez FJ, Guallar P, Rubio C, Villasante P, Guallar E: Cost-effec-
tiveness analysis of pneumococcal vaccination in the elderly
Spanish population. Brit J of Med Econ 1996, 10:193-202.
12. Sisk J, Moskowitz AJ, Whang W, Lin JD, Fedson DS, McBean AM,
Plouffe JF, Cetron MS, Butler JC: Cost-effectiveness of vaccina-
tion against pneumococcal bacteremia among elderly
people. JAMA 1997, 278:1333-1339.
13. Baltussen R, Ament A, Leidl : Cost-effectiveness of vaccination
against pneumococcal pneumonia in The Netherlands. Eur J
of Public Health 1997, 7:153-161.
14. Postma MJ, Heijnen MA, Jager JC: Cost-effectiveness analysis of
pneumococcal vaccination for elderly individuals in The
Netherlands. Pharmacoeconomics 2001, 19(2):215-222.
1 5 . A m e n t  A ,  B a l t u s s e n  R ,  O r t q v i s t  A ,  J ö h n s s o n  B ,  V e r h a e g e n  J ,  d e
Graeve D, Gaillat J, Rigaud-Bully C, Christie P, Salazar Cifre A, Vivas
D, Loiseau C, Fedson D: The cost-effectiveness of pneumococ-
cal vaccination for older people: a study in five western euro-
pean countries. Clin Infect Dis 2000, 31:444-450.
16. Ament A, Fedson DS, Christie P: Pneumococcal vaccination and
pneumonia: even a low efficacy is cost-effective. Clin Infect Dis
2001, 33:2078-2079.
17. Laupacis A, Feeny D, Detsky AS, Tugwell P X: How attractive does
a new technology have to be to warrant adoption and utili-
zation? Tentative guidelines for using clinical and economic
evaluations. CMAJ 1992, 146(4):473-481.
18. Ament A, Baltussen R: Interpreting the results of economic
evaluation; explicating the value of health. Health Economics
1997, 6:625-635.
19. Anderson JP, Bush JW, Chen M, Dolenc D: Policy space areas and
properties of benefit-cost/utility analysis.  JAMA 1986,
255(6):794-795.